Ensuring the cyber resiliency of IEC 61850-based Substation Automation Systems (SAS) is critical for reliable grid operations. This work presents a comprehensive analysis of the performance and security of traditional networking and Software-Defined Networking (SDN) for IEC 61850-based SAS. By leveraging SDN's flow control, proactive traffic engineering, and deny-by-default policies, this study highlights its advantages over traditional networking in critical Operational Technology (OT) applications. Three novel factors for cyber resiliency metrics-network performance, protocol-specific attackability, traffic containment, are proposed, culminating in a unified resiliency score. Experimental evaluations using an enhanced real-time Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL) testbed, includes GOOSE spoofing, DNP3 Denial-of-Service attacks, and network failovers. Results demonstrates SDN's ability to mitigate impact of cyber threats, enhanced network performance, and reduced attack surface. The findings also indicates the significance of adopting SDN at the process bus for scenarios, if full SDN deployment is not feasible. Additionally, this work provides a metric-based approach to evaluate and compare OT network resiliency across various possible configurations.