This paper presents a theoretical inquiry into the domain of artificial intelligence (AI). It investigates a multicameral system, which is a popular scheme in state governance. It investigates the system’s applicability to produce failsafe AI alignment. Decision making by parliaments is often structured as a bicameral system, enabling control of those socio-economic systems, which complexity exceeds complexity of the decision makers. This feature is of interest for the AI-systems that are operating beyond Artificial General Intelligence threshold. The paper answers the question, if AI were organized according to the multicameral governance principle, how far can it be benign. The analysis also elucidates the decision making limits in social systems. The paper hints, if a bicameral parliament were as objective as AI, how complex tasks could be entrusted before the legislative body utterly commits a treason against the constituency. This paper presents a formal information system architecture that mimics the multicameral system. A sobriquet for the architecture is Serial Comptroller Network (SCN). It implements a human-assisted, uninterpretable alignment approach. The discussion focuses on a minimalistic solution within the architectural formalism. An assessment for its digital potential, utility, deficiencies and further improvement options are presented to advance AI research, as well as to aid decision making sophistication in structured socio-economic entities.