Increases in support for the Make America Great Again (MAGA) political movement and decreases in support for Black Lives Matter (BLM) colloquially fluctuate with media coverage that downplayed MAGA violence while overcovering BLM violence. This experiment investigates how exposure to media portrayals of political violence (i.e. violent and destructive protesting) impacts political support among both real-world contexts. In Experiment 1, exposure to violent MAGA protests decreased MAGA support from MAGA’s staunchest supporters, an effect mediated by perceptions of violence in the video. In Experiment 2, exposure to violent BLM protests had virtually no impact on political support and an inconclusive impact on perceived violence. When combined with previous research highlighting that perceptions of violence reduce political support, media exposure to political violence (whether naturally occurring in a media stream or experimentally induced) effectively reduces political support. Overexposure to BLM violence may help explain dwindling BLM support while a surge in MAGA support may be due, in part, to underexposure to MAGA violence. These findings highlight not only the power the media has in driving collective political support and behavior, but they also provide a pathway to reducing political support for violent political agents, simple exposure. Accurate media portrayals of political violence appear necessary for individuals to develop political support that aligns with their best interests, yet suppression and overexaggeration of violence appear to be an active and effective tool for political power.

Individuals are stereotyped based on their perceived identities and there are rising concerns about ableism, ageism, and sexism in the United States. Cultural stereotypes of older adults (including older women and men) living with a disability (LWD) are understudied despite their negative stigmatizations and consequences in different contexts such as in healthcare and employment. In this study, we identified and assessed these stereotypes. Students from three U.S. universities ( N = 401) listed their understanding of the stereotypes of older adults LWD, older men LWD, older women LWD, older men, older women, older adults, persons LWD, men, and women. Data were analyzed using two established methodologies used in stereotyping research. Results revealed that stereotypes of older adults LWD and persons LWD contained shared elements, as the top stereotypes listed for both groups were negative and many overlapped (burdensome, dependent, devalued, “handicapped”, mean, physically slow, sad, unintelligent, unproductive, weak). Negative stereotypes of older adults LWD also included long-standing stereotypes listed of older adults (deteriorating, sick, mean). Gendered stereotypes also emerged for older men (financially stable, leader) and older women (nice) but stereotypes of older men LWD and older women LWD were more closely related to those of disability than of gender. Results also revealed unique stereotypes (e.g., persons LWD as abnormal). Results can help inform much-needed theoretical frameworks and prejudice reduction strategies aimed at improving attitudes toward diverse groups of older adults who may be facing poor health and discrimination due to experiences of ageism, sexism, and/or ableism.

Across multiple studies using diverse samples, we analyze attitudes toward increasing representation of minoritized groups in political spaces. When individuals understand how structural biases impact their own group, they are more likely to recognize the broader influence of these biases on other groups and support systemic change (e.g., Craig et al., 2020). Building on previous research, we examine the role of racial resentment and perceptions of structural bias in maintaining inequality and test how these perceptions predict support for increased political representation by individuals from underrepresented groups (e.g., women, LGBTQ+ groups, immigrants). Results show that feelings of racial resentment predict more negative attitudes toward increased diversity in representation, while beliefs about structural bias predict more positive attitudes, even after accounting for established ideological and identity factors. Our findings suggest efforts to foster support for diversity might be better served by increasing awareness of structural inequalities than appealing to shared identity.

This mixed-methods study examines the experience of the imposter phenomenon in a racially/ethnically and sexually diverse sample of undergraduates in majors related to science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM). Guided by an intersectionality framework, we examined whether experiences of the imposter phenomenon differ at the intersection of race/ethnicity and sexual identity. Survey data from undergraduate STEM students (N = 735) consisting of 559 (76%) racial/ethnic minorities and 169 (23%) lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer/questioning individuals revealed racial/ethnic and sexual identity differences in the amount of imposter phenomenon. Findings also suggest that STEM students with more mentors reported lower imposter phenomenon. This finding was not moderated by race/ethnicity or sexual identity, implying that mentoring may be a form of social support among students in STEM education. To supplement the quantitative findings, we collected open and close-ended data from participants. Thematic analysis of these data provides insight into the range of coping strategies STEM students use when experiencing the imposter phenomenon. Implications and recommendations for research, theory, and policy are further discussed.

Transgender and gender diverse (TGD) Australians experience high unemployment rates and workplace discrimination based on gender identity, despite protections under federal law. There is, however, limited research on the specific experiences and perceptions of TGD people in the Australian STEM workplace. To investigate young adults’ perceptions of TGD people in STEM, we conducted a series of simulated, semi-structured interviews in virtual reality, during which cisgender participants (N = 81) embodied transgender or cisgender virtual avatars and interacted with a transgender virtual interviewer. Our thematic analysis explores patterns of meaning across participant responses regarding popularised STEM workplace policies. Given the Australian socio-political environment, identified themes suggest different levels of engagement with TGD inclusion, highlighting the influence of public discourse on acknowledgment of TGD rights and resistance to changing a cisgender-heteronormative status quo. We classify achievements, challenges, and areas for intervention that highlight gaps between symbolic progress and genuine inclusion. Tokenistic actions appear progressive but fail to address systemic inequities, while informed inclusion requires cultural shifts toward challenging gender essentialism and embracing TGD lived experiences. By committing to meso-level institutional initiatives and consulting on macro-level societal policies, STEM stakeholders can establish standards for progress and improve TGD inclusion in the STEM workplace.

Recent research indicates the need to understand how threats operate at a local level. In the wake of Brexit’s significant impact on Ireland’s political, economic, and social climate, the present research investigated whether information about economic threat posed by this political event affect political preferences in the Republic of Ireland, as well as national identity and boundaries of the national group ( N = 267). We experimentally manipulated perceived economic threat posed by Brexit using fictitious information and assessed political preferences for a ‘United Ireland’. Additionally, we examined the impact of this economic threat for strength of national identification, as well as the boundaries of the national community, measured by civic and ethnic nationalism. We also assessed participants’ agreement with the manipulated information about Brexit as a moderator of these effects. Results indicated that threatening information about Brexit goes along with more support for Irish unity the more participants’ agree with the information and reduces support the more participants’ disagree. There was no effect of threat on national identification or civic and ethnic nationalism. The discussion highlights the implications for constructing threats in political messaging and offers important insights into preferences for Irish unity within the evolving Brexit context.

In this study, we will investigate how expectations regarding the relationship between positivity and negativity may be informing election choices of leftist, left-wing, progressive, Democratic, and liberal-identifying individuals. We also aim to refine understanding of decision-making processes by collecting information about participants’ social identities (e.g., race, class, gender), experiences (e.g., activism participation), depression symptoms, and beliefs (e.g., political cynicism, social justice orientation). We hypothesize that participants likely to devalue reward will (I) report having been less likely and happy to vote for Biden-Harris, but more likely and happy to vote for Harris and Harris-Walz; (II) report lower felt negativity while imagining Trump-Vance winning; (III) report having been more likely to vote third-party before Biden stepped down; and (IV) that political cynicism will moderate reward devaluation. We outline our plans to assess our hypotheses via moderation analyses and nonparametric correlations, as well as propose exploratory analyses.