Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) continues to play a crucial role in securing government networks and providing cryptographic assurance of a person or device’s identity. Its strength depends on using a mathematically related public and private key, where the public key is intentionally shared, and the private key is controlled by an end entity to prove its identity. Quantum computers pose a risk to this paradigm, as they can perform mathematical operations much faster than classical computers. This could allow for quantum computers to derive an entity’s private key from their public key and perform operations while impersonating that entity. This report examines the role of PKI systems in the federal government of the United States (US), commonly used cryptographic algorithms throughout the US government, and how those algorithms could be made vulnerable to exploitation by the advancement of quantum computers. A comparison of the performance differences between Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA), a cryptographic algorithm commonly utilized by Federal PKI systems, and the Post-Quantum Resistant (PQR) digital signature algorithm, CRYSTALS-Dilithium, is also provided. The report concludes with an analysis of the performance of PQR algorithms and considerations that federal agencies will need to make when implementing PKI systems that utilize PQR algorithms.