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\title{Civil-Military Relations in the Aftermath of Coups: How Does Coup
Failure Affect Counterbalancing in Autocratic Regimes?}



\author[1]{Artem Kyzym}%
\affil[1]{University of Gothenburg Faculty of Social Science}%


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  \date{April 24, 2026}


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\begin{abstract}
How do dictators successfully counterbalance (fragment their coercive
apparatus) despite the significant risk of military retaliation? Drawing
on recent insights that the timing of coup-proofing is essential to its
success, I argue that dictators are more likely to increase
counter-balancing efforts in the aftermath of failed coups. I test this
proposition in a difference-in-differences framework, using novel data
on coups and counterbalancing. I find a statistically significant,
albeit moderate effect of coup failure. I substantiate my analysis with
two illustrative examples from Sierra Leone and Turkey that probe the
plausibility of my theorized mechanism. My findings contribute to the
growing literature on the effects of failed coups by opening up the
discussion on their long-term structural consequences for the dictator's
security apparatus.%
\end{abstract}%



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\verb`Manuscript_Final.docx`  available at \url{https://authorea.com/users/887506/articles/1265580-civil-military-relations-in-the-aftermath-of-coups-how-does-coup-failure-affect-counterbalancing-in-autocratic-regimes}

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