This study introduces a novel strategy for mitigating False Data Injection (FDI) attacks within islanded DC microgrids, primarily focusing on enhancing the security of data transmission between buses. This method utilizes secondary control variables, local feedbacks, and event-triggered control to detect, identify, stabilize voltage during FDI attacks, and ultimately eliminate the attacks. The combination of these methods results in the establishment of a resilient control. Secondary control variables, through defining a variable as a detection index (DI) and impact of FDI attacks on per-unit current and estimated average voltage parameters, detect potential attacks. Subsequently, internal feedbacks ensure stability under attack conditions by increasing the gains of the local feedbacks. Moreover, the proposed event-triggered control identifies the magnitude and location of the attack by comparing two events before and after an attack. Finally, the identified attack is mitigated by removing it from the communication link. Furthermore, after mitigating the attack, the local feedbacks cause the system to return to its pre-attack state, restoring voltage regulation and current sharing to their previous levels. Simulations and experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of the approach in stabilizing the system and mitigating various FDI attack scenarios, showcasing its potential for securing DC microgrids.