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\title{Piecing it together: Or how social systems shape~ sociological
descriptions, explanations and generalizations}



\author[1]{Cristián Navarrete}%
\affil[1]{Pontificia Universidad CatÃ³lica de Chile}%


\vspace{-1em}



  
  \date{May 01, 2026}


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\begin{abstract}
Contemporary literature on sociological explanation emphasizes the
microelements of social life, such as causal mechanisms and constitutive
descriptions. This focus has enhanced our ability to localize the
components that perform explanatory functions within theories. However,
we currently have a fragmented understanding of mechanisms, and their
relationships with non-causal explanations and descriptions remain
poorly understood. Addressing these challenges requires shifting the
focus from these microelements to the larger systems they are a part of,
but we currently lack a developed conceptualization of such systems and
how they shape explanations. By simultaneously outlining a general
approach to systems and their sociological specificities, moving beyond
traditional associations with differentiation theories and focusing
on~\emph{mechanization}, I aim to resolve these inconsistencies. This
approach elucidates the relationships between causal mechanisms,
non-causal explanations, and constitutive descriptions, while also
recasting the generalizability of sociological arguments in a more
comprehensible manner and identifying shared underlying principles
across methods.%
\end{abstract}%



\sloppy


\section*{}

{\label{introduction}}

\section*{Introduction}

{\label{introduction}}

Over the last two decades, sociological explanations have increasingly
focused on causal mechanisms, which have become central to the
discipline (Aviles and Reed 2017; Fryer 2022; Knight and Reed 2019;
Tavory and Timmermans 2014). Mechanisms have proven valuable in
sharpening our attention to the microelements of social life (Hirschman
and Reed 2014) and how these elements interact or assemble into causal
chains that produce phenomena of interest (Gross 2018). However,
mechanisms have fallen short of their broader promise to bridge the
interpretative and causal (or naturalist) divide within the social
sciences (Bhaskar 1979; Reed 2011). This bridging potential has been
called into question due to the heterogeneous and ultimately
inconsistent approaches to mechanistic explanations (Aviles and Reed
2017; Knight and Reed 2019; Pozzoni and Kaidesoja 2021). Furthermore,
the identification of mechanisms with explanation itself (Knight and
Reed 2019), and their exaltation over the equally critical role of
description, has faced criticism (Pacewicz 2022).

This has resulted in significant heterogeneity in sociological
arguments, particularly in how they balance explanatory and descriptive
elements. While heterogeneity is not inherently problematic---as
multiple forms of explanation or description can be equally valid or
``scientific'' (cf. Cartwright 1999; Dupr\selectlanguage{ngerman}é 1993; Galison and Stump 1996;
Hacking 2009)---the fragmentation of criteria for defining social
mechanisms, their role in generalizations, and their relationship to
description and other explanatory forms limits our ability to construct
robust sociological arguments. This lack of coherence undermines our
understanding of how to integrate different elements into sociological
explanations effectively.

To address this fragmentation, I argue for a shift in focus from the
microelements of sociological explanations and social life to the larger
systems in which they are embedded. While recognizing that microelements
function within broader social contexts is neither controversial nor
novel, we currently lack a sufficiently developed conceptualization of
these larger systems and their connections to causal mechanisms and
constitutive arguments.

By engaging with contemporary mechanistic philosophy of science---an
area that sociologists have not sufficiently explored (Glennan et al.
2022; Hedström and Ylikoski 2010)---I propose a general (or minimal)
systems approach and a sociologically specific systems framework. This
approach addresses key points of contention and inconsistencies in our
current understanding of mechanisms, their relationship to descriptions,
non-causal explanations, and generalizations. Unlike previous social
systems theories, which rely on functional differentiation and define
systems in terms of individuals, communication, or actions (Habermas
1985; Luhmann 1982, 1995, 2007; Parsons 1970, 1972; Parsons and Shils
{[}1951{]}2017), I conceptualize them as material systems (Haslanger
2016, 2018). Specifically, I define them as networks of humans, material
elements, and cultural elements, bound by causal and constitutive
relations that in virtue of its actors' activities do something, and
perdure due to the \emph{mechanization} of human action (see Reed 2020).

This article is structured in three parts. First, the article examines
the current debates on sociological explanations and generalizations,
with a focus on causal mechanisms and constitutive arguments,
emphasizing the key points of contention and inconsistencies across
approaches. Second, a general systems approach alongside a material
approach to social systems will be proposed. Finally, the article
discusses the practical implications of this framework for sociological
theory, particularly in relation to explanations, case selection, and
generalizations. To illustrate its utility, I will draw on empirical
examples exploring the relationship between gender and labor-market
outcomes.

\par\null

\section*{The rise and pitfalls of mechanistic
explanations}\label{the-rise-and-pitfalls-of-mechanistic-explanations}

As Bacevic (2024) notices one could say that there is a minimal
consensus in that to explain something is to account for a process that
entails a relationship between cause and effect. This is pretty much the
received position within the rise of mechanistic explanations in
sociology. The overarching idea being that mechanistic explanation posit
models that describe causal information that links X to Y, where such
causal information can refer to actors' interactions, beliefs,
interests, habits, meanings, resources and material stuff (see for e.g.
Elster 1989; Gross 2018; Hedström and Ylikoski 2010; Hirschman and Reed
2014; Reed 2011; Ritz 2023).

Mechanistic approaches in the social sciences can be traced back to
sociological arguments developed by Parsons and Merton during the 1930's
and the philosophical realism of Harré and Bhaskar during the 1970's.
Since then, the mechanistic movement has expanded both in sociology and
its key idea is that causality is a generative process where X produces
Y through the action of causal process/mechanism M (Hirschman and Reed
2014). Thus, to mechanistically explain is to show \emph{why dependence}
between events or entities holds by describing how they hang together
thanks to a series of chained elements and activities. This core idea
serves to highlight that when thinking about mechanisms we are thinking
about the set of elements that causes our phenomenon of interest (cf.
Groff 2017; Gross 2018). Such general comprehension of mechanisms
carries the promise to bridge the \emph{interpretative} and
\emph{causal} divide in the social sciences (see Reed 2011), as
mechanisms could be said to include many heterogeneous entities and
activities.

Specifically, as Knight and Reed (2019) identified, mechanistic
approaches often share three key characteristics that contribute to
explanatory power: (1) providing causal information, (2) explaining a
generalizable process, and (3) decomposing the process into its
constituent elements. Firstly, while a mechanistic approach does not
require a specific theory of causation, it does shape our understanding
of it. It emphasizes the need to describe a process where X tends to
produce Y through a series of activities encompassed within mechanism M.
Secondly, good mechanistic explanations are generalizable because the
processes they describe can apply to a wider range of cases. This is one
of their strengths, as it allows qualitative studies, even if not
strictly representative, to offer insights into unobserved contexts
through (Collins et al., 2024; Small 2009). Lastly, mechanistic
explanations break down processes into finer-grained components and
activities, enabling a clearer understanding of the relationship between
two phenomena.

Beyond this, however, there are many contending characterizations of
social mechanisms (Aviles and Reed 2017; Author 2024b) that in some
cases even result in contradictory positions (Knight and Reed 2019).
Different ways of distinguishing between mechanistic approaches can be
identified. They point to slightly different aspects of mechanistic
explanations and their characterization, but they overlap. First, if one
focuses primarily on the sociological stances informing mechanistic
approaches one can distinguish (see Author 2024b) between the pragmatist
(e.g., Gross 2009, 2018), critical realist (e.g., Fryer 2022; Gorski
2009; Ritz 2023) and analytical approaches (e.g., Hedström and Ylikoski
2010). Advocates of pragmatic approaches incorporate meaning, signs,
habit and creativity to explain how actors solve problems and phenomena
emerges and tend to either ``bracket'' the ontological question of
mechanisms or understand them as useful models. Critical realists
believe that mechanisms are part of the causal structure of the world
and our models capture such structures, that in the case of social
sciences refer to social structures, agency and culture. Lastly,
analytic sociologists ground their mechanistic approaches in a version
of methodological individualism that highlights actors' desires,
beliefs, and opportunities, and from there build up meso and macro-level
phenomena.

By focusing on mechanisms explanatory nature Aviles and Reed (2017)
identified three different standards for mechanical explanations: (1)
the \emph{substantial}, (2) \emph{formalist}, and (3) the
\emph{metaphoric.} The first standard defines mechanistic explanations
as those that identify the entities that in interaction lead to certain
outcomes and believes that the concepts used in such explanations
directly refer to the causal capacities of those entities. In other
words, as critical realists, those who adhere to the \emph{substantial}
standard commit to mechanistic explanations that describe causal
processes of real entities, their properties and tendencies. The
\emph{formalist} dispenses with the ontological goals that the previous
standard adheres to, and approach mechanistic explanations as producing
simplified abstractions of generic process, thus making a harder
distinction between mechanistic models and the target system that we
want to explain (see Manzo 2010). This standard is common among
quantitative scholars that understand intervening variables as
mechanisms as well as analytical sociologists that focus on modelling.
The \emph{metaphoric} standard denotes scholars that do not necessarily
want to commit to the ontological reality of mechanisms, but find the
imagery of mechanisms to be useful for organizing observations (see for
e.g., Reed 2011, 2020)---specifically, its regular and stable nature.

Similarly, Knight and Reed (2019) showed that there are two
contradictory characterizations of mechanisms within sociology: the
modular and the meaningful one. The modular approach is associated with
analytical sociologists (e.g. Hedström and Ylikoski 2010) and their
\emph{counterfactual criterion of relevance,} which dictates that
relevant features for explanation are identified using counterfactuals:
any feature that, if altered, would change the given outcome. This
requires, as Knight and Reed argued, that the elements of a causal
system to be \emph{modular.} That is, when you intervene in one part of
the system, that change should not affect relationships among the other
parts. To explain this concept, the authors use~ Pedulla's (2016) study
as an example, where he examines how nonstandard employment histories
lead to discrimination in the labor market and proposes two mechanisms:
assessments of competence and assessments of commitment to work. The
causal system here would be considered modular if you could---at least
theoretically---intervene in one mechanism (strong competence) without
influencing the other (perception of commitment).

The meaningful approach draws on pragmatism and aims to incorporate
meanings, symbols, signs and habit into social mechanistic explanations
(e.g., Gross 2009, 2018; Tavory and Timmermans 2013). This perspective
argues that meaning exerts causal influence through the accumulation of
interpretation and action chains (Knight and Reed 2019). By analyzing
such an interplay, we can describe the causal processes leading to a
phenomenon of interest. Consider Tavory and Timmermans (2013) study on
the strained relationship between clinicians and parents. They showed
that this was the outcome of a shared interpretive frame established
during the initial interaction, where parents perceived their newborns
as ill despite clinicians later acknowledging it as a false positive.
This shared understanding, rooted in the parents' interpretation,
persists even as clinicians revise their own understanding. Thus, the
situation is explained by a semiotic structure within both parties'
interpretations that deviates from the child's actual health status. And
this process qualifies as causal in the mechanistic sense because it
``determines the space of possible subsequent interpretations and
actions'' (Knight and Reed 2019: 244) of the involved actors.

In addition to these differences, Pozzoni and Kaidesoja (2021)
identified many notions of context-independence that are currently under
play in mechanistic explanations. The first is \emph{theory-oriented
context dependence,} where mechanisms are taken to be
\emph{how-possibly} models that abstract key elements that make some
phenomena happen and can be used in further research. Here, the focus is
not on describing how something \emph{actually} happened, but on
producing a parsimonious \emph{portable} theory. The second sense refers
to \emph{population-based context dependence.} This is the concept most
quantitative sociologists will be familiar with, because it defines
dependence as a statistical relationship between sample and population
such that their explanatory purposes are satisfied to the extent that
they are supported by empirical knowledge. Here, mechanisms are used to
identify intervening variables, but they are not taken to be
generalizable to other populations. The last concept refers to
\emph{case-oriented context dependence,} where researchers aim to give
comprehensive explanations of \emph{how} particular outcomes are
produced by causal mechanisms. Although it seems counterintuitive, this
does not mean that mechanisms are always \emph{case-dependent,} but
rather it is an empirical question whether a researcher successfully
identified a generalizable interaction process between actors and
entities. With this, mechanisms not only have the potential to bridge
the \emph{interpretative/causal} divide, but also the quantitative and
qualitative divide because they can be used in both historical,
ethnographic and mathematical or statistical methods.

Thus, while the current sociological debate literature on mechanistic
explanations agrees on some general features---as the causal and
decompositional nature of mechanisms---the specifical ontological
commitments toward them and their role in explanations varies. Table 1
below, orders and summarizes these differences according to general
sociological approaches to mechanisms and its commitments. In general,
it is possible to map some general sociological approaches to mechanisms
and its ontological and epistemological commitments, although these
positions are probably not completely homogeneous.~

~

\textbf{***Please insert Table 1 around here ***}

~~~~~~~~~~~

~Table 1 identifies the key positions and aspects of the current debate
on mechanistic explanations within sociology. Beyond the ontological
debate on the reality of mechanisms (see Author 2024b), it should be
noted that there are also relevant epistemological differences. The
tension arises when we acknowledge that meaningful mechanisms do not
comply with the modularity criterion. If the pragmatist view on the
relationship between meaning and action is accurate, then intervening in
one aspect would necessarily affect the other. And the same is true for
critical realists as they insist in the open nature of the social world
(Archer 1995; Bhaskar 1975; Elder-Vass 2010), such that interventions
need not to always lead to counterfactual dependence. As Knight and Reed
(2019) argue, this re-instantiates classical divisions
between~\emph{explanation ~}and~\emph{understanding~}because we have
contradictory explanatory criteria for mechanisms. Which holds back the
promise of social mechanisms to be a unifying approach to explanation.~

~

\subsection*{What about description or non-causal
arguments?}\label{what-about-description-or-non-causal-arguments}

In addition to the fragmented nature of our understanding of
sociological explanations, Pacewicz (2022) has shown that the current
focus and exaltation of mechanisms is problematic. As Pacewicz argues,
this recasting of explanation in terms of mechanisms has had the effect
of equating causality to the most scientific aspects of the discipline,
which is problematic because a substantive part ethnographic claims are
what he terms \emph{constitutive arguments}---which are not causal.
Then, not only within mechanistic explanations we remain with a
fragmented understanding, but also its relation to other forms of
sociological arguments is not sufficiently understood.

Pacewicz (2022) argues that the alternative to causal arguments in
ethnography is not simply ``mere description.'' Instead, he proposes the
use of~\emph{constitutive arguments}, which he defines as
context-independent analytical descriptions that explore how social
phenomena emerge and how we can categorize them effectively. They take
the form of: (1) X exists in a given human group; (2) X is a case of Y;
and (3) X has the properties X1, X2, X3 \ldots{} Xn. According to
Pacewicz, these arguments ultimately result in explanations focused on
the defining elements of a phenomenon and their interconnectedness.
While such arguments may bear some connection to causal factors, they
are distinct as they refer to the correct identification,
categorization, and description of what a phenomenon is. Thus, if causal
mechanisms explain how small elements acting in a chain are responsible
for~\emph{why~}something happened the way it did, constitutive arguments
try to identify~\emph{what~}those smaller bits are as well as what is
the best conceptualization of the broad phenomenon of interest. ~

He further argues that constitutive arguments hold value for
ethnographers seeking to extend their empirical findings to unobserved
situations. He maintains that even in the simplest cases, such as X
exists, ethnographers ground their arguments by providing some warrant
for thinking that the phenomenon is relevant in other cases. In Pacewicz
(2022: 946) words ``a successful existence proof is simultaneously and
importance proof.'' This extension is possible through the selection of
specific cases: (1) \emph{pointy} (see also Small 2009) or (2)
\emph{resolutive cases}.

\emph{Pointy cases} leverage unique situations that deviate from the
norm to develop theory. Pacewicz (2022) uses Vargas's (2016) study on
the relationship between political efficacy and neighborhood violence.
As Pacewicz frames it, Vargas's case is pointy because it strategically
leverages the fact that Chicago's Little Village is separated into two
similar halves that differ (theoretically) solely in gerrymandering. The
west side is a single alderman's district that has witnessed a decline
in violent crime, while the east side is gerrymandered into three
aldermanic districts that have witnessed an anomalous increase in
violent crimes. This allows Vargas to comparatively study how political
efficacy leads residents to obtain violence prevention, jobs and
surveillance programs. His analysis does not prove that political
efficacy matters in other non-observed cases, but as Pacewicz notes, by
describing how political efficacy is a central \emph{constituent} of
crime prevention it does give the reader logical reasons to expect
similar causal effects elsewhere.

The \emph{resolutive} strategy, in contrast, involves seeking cases that
enable researchers to resolve theoretical contradictions within the
existing literature. Here Pacewicz (2022) takes Desmond's (2012) work
with the urban poor in Milwaukee. While Desmond cites various studies,
his primary focus is on Stack's (1997) pioneer work, which argued that
the urban poor rely on kinship and friendship networks for survival.
This notion aligns with intuition. However, Desmond posits that severe
economic deprivation can render reliance on kin networks virtually
impossible for the poor. Based on this argument, he articulates a
problem that Stack's position cannot readily address: how do the poor
survive when kinship support is no longer available? This theoretical
contradiction is solved by the introduction of \emph{disposable ties,}
that are defined as ``relations between new acquaintances characterized
by accelerated and simulated intimacy, a high amount of physical
copresence (time spent together), reciprocal or semi reciprocal resource
exchange, and (usually) a relatively short lifespan'' (Desmond 2012:
1311). This is a \emph{constitutive argument} that defines and
characterizes disposable ties and, as Pacewicz argues, in successfully
describing the logic of such ties, Desmond gives logical warrant why
such ties might be in play in other non-observed contexts.

Thus, constitutive arguments bridge the gap between empirical and
theoretical generalizations by establishing their external validity on
two key elements: (1) an accurate description of empirical reality and
(2) the development of precise theoretical vocabulary. This is achieved
through the selection of unique and resolutive cases that effectively
capture the constituent parts of social phenomena. The accurate
description involved in these strategies does not ``prove'' that a
certain constitutive element is actually working in other non-observed
cases, but it does give us logical warrants to expect that it might.
According to Pacewicz (2022: 945), this is mainly because constitutive
arguments try to identify the ``building blocks of the social and how to
best categorize them.''

Constitutive arguments are a cornerstone of sociological research,
holding as much significance as mechanistic explanations in the
development of theory and generalizations. However, Pacewicz's (2022)
intervention accentuates a further divide between mechanisms and
descriptions. From Pacewicz's assertion that these represent distinct
types of knowledge claims, it remains unclear how they interrelate,
beyond the observation that ethnographers occasionally employ both
approaches. Admittedly, addressing this interrelation is not the primary
objective of his article. Nevertheless, achieving a clearer
understanding of their relationship is a critical task for advancing our
understanding of sociological explanations further.

As the following sections will argue, a more comprehensive understanding
of their relationship requires a systemic perspective. By adopting this
broader lens, we can circumvent the unintended strict divide between
explanation and description.

~

\section*{Systems: generally, and sociologically
speaking}\label{systems-generally-and-sociologically-speaking}

The previous section identified five key issues that must be addressed
to achieve a comprehensive understanding of contemporary sociological
explanation: (1) maximal definitions of social mechanisms, (2)
modularity, (3) heterogeneous standards for mechanistic explanation, (4)
the relationship between causal and constitutive explanations, and (5)
context-dependence, or the challenge of generalization.

Historically, both social mechanisms and systems have been defined
maximally (cf. Reed 2011, 2023), often closely tied to preferred
sociological theories. This practice fragments sociological explanations
and generates incongruent perspectives shaped by theoretical
preferences. Social systems theory, deeply rooted in 20th-century
theories of functional differentiation, has primarily divided society
into variations of personal, cultural, and societal systems, with
subsystems encompassing domains such as the economy, religion, and law
(Habermas 1985; Luhmann 1982, 1995, 2007; Parsons 1970, 1972; Parsons
and Shils {[}1951{]}2017). However, this approach creates significant
issues. For example, in the works of Parsons and Habermas, a notable gap
arises between meaningful action and systemic structures (Joas and Knöbl
2009; Schwinn 1998). Alternatively, Luhmann's general systems theory
evolves into a highly internally coherent framework, but one that is
largely self-referential and empirically difficult to apply or test.

While it is encouraging that meta-theoretical discussions continue to
engage with sociological theory and practice (Haslanger 2024a; Reed
2017; Sarkia and Kaidesoja 2023), the concept of the social system has
often been rejected in sociology, likely due to its strong associations
with functionalist paradigms (Martin 2024; Walby 2007). Consequently,
because social systems theory is often equated with the work of Parsons
or Luhmann, sociologists have tended to avoid the concept altogether or
employ it only loosely. For instance, in the social mechanisms
literature, there is no well-developed concept of a social system beyond
its treatment as background conditions (e.g., Gross 2018) or as the
broader causal system within which mechanisms operate (e.g., Knight and
Reed 2019). This leaves us without a clear understanding of what is
common to systems across the sciences, what specifically distinguishes
social systems from those in other fields, and what do we gain with them
beyond describing some background conditions. ~

Fortunately, we are now well-positioned to broaden our scope and
identify shared principles with other sciences (e.g., Glennan 2017;
Glennan et al. 2022; Haslanger 2024a,b; M. Mitchell 2009). This allows
for the development of a minimal set of concepts that avoids overly
functionalist connotations while remaining specific to the unique
features of social systems. Rather than extend the most common systems
approaches---such as Luhmann's general systems theory---which have been
extensively critiqued (Elder-Vass 2007; Fischer-Lescano 2012; Jackson
1985; Joas and Knöbl 2009; Schwinn 1998; B. S. Turner 2014; S. Turner
2014; Walby 2007), I propose an alternative approach to systems. In the
following sections, I will outline this approach and demonstrate how it
addresses the five key problems identified in contemporary social
explanations.

~

\subsection*{(Social) systems: or when action becomes
mechanic}\label{social-systems-or-when-action-becomes-mechanic}

As Glennan (2017) argues, mechanistic systems possess two key features:
(1) they are wholes composed of parts, and (2) they do things based on
the activities and interactions of those parts. These systems engage in,
or are disposed to engage in, processes characterized by causal chains
that are defined by the sequence of their parts' activities and
interactions. In contrast, complex systems theorists, such as Haslanger
(2023, 2024b), challenge such mechanistic and compositional views. They
argue that complex systems are self-organizing, homeostatic, dynamic,
and evolving. Moreover, these systems involve inter-level feedback loops
that conflict with the strict localization and decomposition typically
associated with mechanistic systems (see also Potochnik 2021; Potochnik
and McGill 2012).

There are compelling reasons to believe that social phenomena cannot be
strictly decomposable, as required by the modularity criterion or by
predefined levels and independent parts. Human actors, for example, are
fundamentally shaped by the group-forming processes they participate in,
such as those in schools or workplaces (Abbott 1997; Haslanger 2024b;
Liu and Emirbayer 2016). Furthermore, the heterogeneous entities
involved in sociological explanations---such as carbon, norms, human
actors, and policies (e.g., Mitchell 2009)---often resist the strict
mechanistic frameworks typically applied in the sciences (Author 2024a;
Zahle 2021).

Glennan's (2017) minimal approach to mechanisms, however, does not
necessarily require strict decomposability in the sense of modularity
involving entirely independent parts. Instead, his framework allows for
part-whole relationships without assuming complete independence of
components. However, to move beyond the limitations of strict
mechanistic explanations, I propose approaching social systems through
the practices that humans render \emph{mechanistic} by delegating their
projects to other humans and technologies.

As Reed (2020) insightfully observes, Weber and Latour's insights
consist in emphasizing that broad social phenomena are stabilized
through the mechanization of meaningful action and its prolonged
durability via technology. In this view, social systems emerge and
persist through the power of individuals or groups to delegate projects
to others---both human and material stuff---thereby compelling them to
act in regularized ways, with delimited objectives, strategies, and
functions, as if they were vectors in a broader chain of action linked
to an original delegator.

Reed's (2020) analysis of the chains of power extending from the King to
seventeenth-century Virginia, and how these chains evolved through the
early American Republic and into modernity, provides a compelling
illustration of these processes. Reed demonstrates how the King's
authority was enacted in Virginia despite his physical absence, through
expansive chains of material elements and signs that rendered him a
\emph{present absence}. These chains mobilized a multitude of actors as
agents of the King's project, thereby ensuring its durability. In Reed's
(2020:115) own words:

\begin{quote}
\begin{quote}
The chain of power and its representation, then, began with God,
traveled through King Charles II, and then on to the King's Privy
Council. The council mediated the contact of humans with the King's
body, and the King gave his stamp to the appointed Governor of Virginia.
This actor for the King was thus tasked, as agent, with maintaining
order in the colony itself. In so doing, he drew from the advice of the
Council of State to a great degree (a kind of surrogate privy council),
as well as the ``little Parliament'' of the colony of Virginia, elected
by freeholders (and, in 1676, by freemen). This hierarchy was
simultaneously a real elite political network along which commands
flowed and through which favors were exchanged, and a fantastical
imaginary, maintained by signifiers of the King, which bequeathed
legitimacy to the smallest declaration and most inconsequential project
in the swamps of Virginia.
\end{quote}
\end{quote}

By examining how certain actors delegate projects to others, who in turn
become agents of those individual or collective projects, we can shift
our focus from abstract discussions of mechanisms to the concept of
\emph{mechanization processes}. These processes involve humans and
technologies forming chains of action to accomplish specific projects.
This reframing dissolves the binary choice between complexity and
mechanistic theories. By emphasizing practices that become mechanistic,
even empirically non-decomposable social systems can be analytically
decomposed because power relations simplify and reproduce actions in
ways that justify such an approach.

Unlike systems that are naturally systematic---such as an animal's
digestive system---social systems require ordering to become systematic.
While all systems, broadly speaking, may have a history, social systems
are unique in that humans, through interactions with other humans,
resources, and material entities, actively create or enforce mechanistic
processes that lead to system formation. These ideas are summarized in
Table 2.

~

\textbf{*** Please insert Table 2 around here ***}

~

Drawing on the works of Chang (2022), Haslanger (2018), Reed (2020), and
Glennan (2017; Glennan et al. 2022), I propose a set of general and
minimal definitions for key terms. These definitions are first
articulated for general domains and then adapted to the specific context
of social phenomena. They are intentionally minimal, in that they do not
require much, and are designed as a starting point for further inquiry.
Importantly, these definitions aim to avoid the maximalist tendencies
(problem 1) inherent in earlier approaches to mechanisms and social
systems, particularly those associated with functionalist
interpretations.

A system, for example, does not need to function consistently, pursue a
predetermined goal, exhibit self-regulation, or maintain perfect
coherence---these attributes occur along a spectrum. Systems can include
entities/objects like cars or clocks, but social systems are better
understood as combinations of entities, practices, and their
organization (cf. Krickel 2018). Just as the climate is not a single
thing or entity, neither are social systems such as schools,
laboratories, or parliaments. Nevertheless, these systems endure over
time (Krickel 2018) and play a significant explanatory role (Glennan
2017).

Similarly, mechanisms do not need to operate with regularity in
producing a phenomenon (Little 1991; Elster 1999; Manzo 2010), adhere to
modularity (Hedström and Ylikoski 2010), or originate solely from
individuals' desires, beliefs, and opportunities. Social mechanisms, in
particular, are defined by \emph{relations of delegation} to humans and
technologies. This implies that mechanistic explanations should identify
and localize all elements involved in these delegations, whether they
are individual characteristics, material components, or meaningful
elements. This approach not only aligns with a minimal definition of
mechanisms but also specifies the unique characteristics of social
mechanisms, accommodating diverse theoretical and empirical perspectives
through its focus on mechanization processes.

Finally, practices are understood as coordinated human actions that
utilize resources and are organized for various purposes. These
practices rely on the ordering of actions and their stabilization
through the delegation of projects to other humans and technologies,
with the aim of mechanizing courses of action.

These minimal definitions and their sociological adaptations address (1)
the limitations of maximal definitions tied to functionalism and other
sociological frameworks. As I will demonstrate in the following section,
they also resolve key explanatory issues related to (2) modularity, (3)
the heterogeneous standards for mechanistic explanations, (4) the
relationship between causal and constitutive explanations, and (5)
generalization.

~

\section*{Implications: piecing together sociological
explanations}\label{implications-piecing-together-sociological-explanations}

\subsection*{Modularity and standards for mechanistic
explanations}\label{modularity-and-standards-for-mechanistic-explanations}

As Glennan (2017) argues, while decomposability can be used to define
mechanisms---given that mechanisms explain phenomena through composition
and causal relations---it is not synonymous with modularity.
Decomposability depends on the specific phenomenon being explained,
making modularity a potential outcome of decomposability rather than a
defining feature. Consequently, it is entirely plausible for some social
phenomena to exhibit modular elements while others do not. By excluding
modularity from the definition of mechanisms, as we have done by
adopting Glennan's minimal definition and the proposed sociological
adaptation, the inconsistency between meaningful and modular approaches
(Problem 2) is effectively resolved.

It is not, as Knight and Reed (2019) suggested, that modular approaches
``carve the world at its joints'' while meaningful approaches reveal the
productive capacity of meaning---an argument that appears to imply the
former accesses a deeper, more causal reality while the latter does not.
Instead, researchers coming from pragmatism and analytical sociology are
likely to address phenomena with varying degrees of decomposability due
to their theoretical focus. Under this minimal framework,
decomposability becomes an empirical question. If some social phenomena
are indeed more decomposable than others---as illustrated by Pedulla's
(2016) work---then the focus should shift to investigating the
interactions between human actors that render certain phenomena more
\emph{machine-like} than others (Reed 2020).

One solution proposed by Knight and Reed (2019) to navigate the tension
between meaningful and modular approaches is to recognize that the
concept of mechanisms in the social sciences is often metaphorical.
Mechanisms, in this view, sensitize researchers to general features and
causal processes that unfold in regular ways. This perspective frames
both approaches as providing sufficient, though not necessary, routes
for sociological explanation. While remaining agnostic about the
ontological nature of mechanisms may facilitate agreement on their
causal relevance and generality, it does not address the underlying
differences in the characteristics of mechanistic explanations. For
instance, analytical sociologists emphasize the regular and
generalizable behavior of mechanisms, while critical realists are
committed to the emergent reality of social structures, agency, and
culture (see Elder-Vass 2010; Author 2024a).

Remaining agnostic and treating mechanisms as metaphors may serve as a
pragmatic short-term solution, but it ultimately falls short of
resolving deeper issues in sociological explanation---whether
mechanistic or otherwise. Knight and Reed (2019) rightly argue that
mechanisms do not need to be developed within formal or mathematical
frameworks and that they should not become default stand-ins for
explanation. Nevertheless, significant insights can be gained by
emphasizing shared features of mechanistic concepts across the sciences.
Glennan's minimal definition demonstrates how these shared features
reveal epistemic commonalities among scientific fields that employ
mechanistic explanations while allowing for pluralism in explanatory
approaches (Glennan et al. 2022).

Moreover, while Knight and Reed are correct in suggesting that
meaningful and modular approaches offer alternative explanatory routes,
the general and sociological definition of mechanisms (as summarized in
Table 2) indicates that they are not strictly metaphorical. Mechanisms,
as conceptualized here, allow for ontological commitments (Aviles and
Reed 2017). Although I address the issue of sociological realism more
comprehensively elsewhere (Author 2024b), it is worth noting that, even
when mechanisms are abstracted, idealized, modeled graphically,
mathematically, or linguistically, the coherence and reproducibility of
these methods across time and contexts provide strong evidence of their
reality (cf. Chang 2022). Therefore, mechanisms reflect something real
about the causal ordering of the world, even if our current
articulations are incomplete or imperfect.

As Glennan et al. (2022) emphasize, minimally defining mechanisms and
acknowledging that mechanistic models---whether mathematical, simulated,
diagrammatic, material, or linguistic---are partial, perspectival (see
also Massimi 2022), idealized, abstract, and plural does not negate
their grounding in real-world phenomena. Mechanisms are real entities or
processes, and we attempt to describe and explain their workings through
the construction of various models. Importantly, the most effective
mechanistic models are not necessarily the most detailed or
fine-grained; their adequacy depends on the specific explanatory
objectives.

By adopting this framework, we can resolve the inconsistency between
multiple standards for mechanistic explanation (Problem 3). These
standards all aim to capture real causal processes, albeit indirectly,
through models of varying formalization. While the concept of a
mechanism metaphorically evokes machine-like functioning, it ultimately
refers to relations of delegation---where humans and technology render
courses of action mechanical.

~

\subsection*{Social systems, explanations and
descriptions}\label{social-systems-explanations-and-descriptions}

As Bacevic (2024) notes, there seems to be some consensus that to
explain a phenomenon is to account for a process involving a
relationship between cause and effect. This position is reflected in
various mechanistic approaches within sociology, which, in some cases,
equate explanation solely with mechanistic explanations (Knight and Reed
2019; Pacewicz 2022). However, not all forms of explanation require the
identification of causal relationships. More broadly, explanation
involves demonstrating that a phenomenon (the explanandum) depends on
some other phenomenon (the explanans), where causal explanations are
just one form of dependence, albeit the most common in the sciences
(Glennan 2017).

Glennan (2017) provides a useful framework by identifying three types of
explanations: (1) bare causal explanations, (2) mechanistic
explanations, (3) and non-causal explanations. The first, bare causal
explanations, are \emph{what-but-not-how explanations} that identify
causal relationships---what events, properties, or states of affairs
cause or causally depend on some other phenomenon---without detailing
the processes involved. Mechanistic explanations, in contrast, are
\emph{how explanations} that describe how organized activities and
interactions of entities cause or constitute the phenomenon being
explained. Finally, non-causal explanations are
\emph{why-but-not-what-or-how explanations} that do not specify the
causes or processes leading to a phenomenon but instead reveal the
constraints or structures within which mechanisms operate.

In sociology, gendered patterns in job-market outcomes provide great
examples of these explanatory types. For bare causal
explanations\protect\hyperlink{_edn1}{{[}i{]}}, evidence shows that
having children positively impacts fathers' incomes while negatively
affecting mothers' incomes (Berniell et al. 2021; Blau and Kahn 2016;
Kleven et al. 2019; Yu and Hara 2021). This phenomenon has been framed
through concepts such as the \emph{motherhood penalty} (the income loss
mothers experience compared to non-mothers) and the \emph{parental
gender gap} (the income disparity between mothers and fathers) (Goldin
et al. 2024). These causal relationships suggest that the effect of
parenthood on income depends on gender, raising questions about the
mechanisms responsible for these patterns.

Mechanistic explanations of the parental gender gap might include
hypotheses such as fathers working harder after having children or
becoming fathers when their incomes are already higher (Goldin et al.
2024). Similarly, mechanisms behind the motherhood penalty include
mothers taking career breaks, working fewer hours due to caregiving
responsibilities, selecting lower-paying but more flexible jobs, or
experiencing losses in human capital (Berniell et al. 2021;
Cukrowska-Torzewska and Matysiak 2020). These mechanisms elucidate how
specific patterns of income disparity are produced through individuals'
actions or interactions.

While the example has been predominantly framed in quantitative terms,
this does not imply that explanations must rely solely on quantitative
approaches. Qualitative research is equally essential for understanding
how the dependence between job-market-related events (such as income)
and gender unfolds. Statistical dependencies are ultimately rooted in
actual situated actions and meaningful decision-making processes (Deming
2022), which are often best captured through qualitative methods.
Furthermore, it is important to recognize that statistical constructions
are just useful mathematizations of real-world chains of action and
meaning making or models that account for real mathematical patterns in
social life (Becker 2017; Martin 2017, 2018).

Non-causal explanations further enrich our understanding by addressing
why mothers earn less than non-mothers and fathers. They highlight the
role of social systems and their constraints in shaping the actions
individuals perceive as desirable or reasonable (Haslanger 2016; see
also Reutlinger 2017). For example, parents weigh trade-offs between
working hours, financial resources, and caregiving responsibilities,
leading mothers to reduce their work hours or leave the labor force
entirely (Berniell et al. 2021; Goldin 2014; Goldin et al. 2024).
Additionally, child-related benefits influence these decisions, with
evidence suggesting that expanding childcare programs could
significantly improve maternal labor force participation and overall
household welfare (Guner et al. 2020).

To understand how these phenomena intersect with non-causal
explanations, Haslanger's (2016) hypothetical scenario provides valuable
insights. Drawing on Okin (1989) and Cudd (2006), Haslanger introduces a
couple, Larry and Lisa, who possess equal workplace abilities,
experience, power dynamics, and freedom from gender-role prejudices.
When they decide to have children, they encounter structural challenges,
such as the unavailability of affordable childcare in their location and
a persistent wage gap where women earn only 75\% of what men earn. In
this scenario, Lisa quits her job while Larry continues working. Here,
Haslanger poses two critical questions: Why does Lisa quit her job
instead of Larry? And why does Lisa not seek alternative childcare
solutions? In her own words:~

\begin{quote}
\begin{quote}
The fact is that Lisa quit her job because she chose to \emph{and Larry
didn't also choose to quit his job.} It is a background structural
constraint that they both can't quit, and so Larry's behavior, their
relationship, and the limited options available are crucial to
explaining her action. As before, it seems better to shift the object of
explanation to the structure: Why did Lisa end up in the gully (so to
speak)? Because Lisa is part of a system that includes Larry, her
employer, etc., and given that Larry wasn't going to quit, the employer
wasn't going to provide childcare, and she couldn't just leave Lulu home
alone, this was her only real option. She might have made a rational
choice to quit, but it is inadequate to just point to her choice as if
it occurred independently of the workings of the system. (p. 11)
\end{quote}
\end{quote}

As Haslanger (2016) argues, answering why a mother might choose to quit
her job (or why mothers might earn less than fathers) can be
non-causally explained by examining the social systems in which parents
act. Returning to the proposed definitions in this article (see Table
2), a parent's actions can be understood at the intersection of at least
two key material systems: the labor market and the parental system.
These systems encompass a set of humans (e.g., parents, children,
employers, family, childcare providers), material elements (e.g.,
workplaces, childcare facilities, transportation, income, housing), and
cultural elements (e.g., gender-role prejudices). These elements are
bound by causal relations (e.g., the impact of having children and
gender on income) and constitutive elements (e.g., the humans,
materials, and cultural components that comprise the systems). Through
human relations, these systems either produce products or services in
the labor market or enable caregiving, and they persist through the
mechanization of employer-employee relationships and the delegation of
caregiving responsibilities within households.

As Figure 1 illustrates, the structure that explains why Lisa quits her
job can be understood through the relationships between employers,
parents, and the availability of childcare and financial resources. The
colored segmented lines represent the system's structure, where cultural
elements (such as gender-role prejudices) are a shared set of cognitive
elements that make us experience our relations with others (and things)
embedded with qualities inherent to them, providing resources for
justifying actions. (Haslanger 2018; Lizardo 2017, 2023; Martin 2011;
Reed 2024). Together, these actors, cultural elements, and material
resources form a social system that encompasses causal processes over
time (represented by the horizontal arrows), leading to phenomena like
mothers earning less than non-mothers after having a child. For
simplicity, the figure includes only a selection of actors and material
elements relevant to mothers' earnings outcomes, but additional systems,
such as city transportation networks, could also be incorporated.

\textbf{*** Please insert Figure 1 around here ***}

This highlights the importance of analyzing systems and their structure
to achieve non-causal explanations. Through a detailed description of
how systems are organized, we can not only provide non-causal
explanations but also construct mechanistic explanations for causal
relations. Situating actors within broader relationships and systems
enables us to trace the multiple causal chains that produce outcomes of
interest (Gross 2018). In Lisa's case, her decision to quit can be
explained by examining how action is mechanized---or fails to be
mechanized---both in the workplace and in caregiving. If the employer
delegates tasks to Lisa through inflexible work shifts, and parents fail
to delegate caregiving to others (e.g., family members or childcare
facilities) due to the structure of these systems, we can explain her
decision through these chains of mechanization (and their failures) as
well as, non-causally, through the structural properties of the social
space (cf. Díaz and Watkins 2024).

Social systems are also relevant for understanding how we describe
actions and phenomena of interest. A key consideration for ethnographers
is the construction of their cases (Collins et al. 2024; Small 2009)
through fieldwork. This involves iterative processes of identifying what
is sociologically relevant and interpreting observations within the
context of specialized literature (cf. Lareau 2021). While constructing
cases often relies on \emph{puzzles} (Mears 2017) or \emph{casing}
strategies (Collins et al. 2024), these approaches are fundamentally
tied to situating observed actions and events within the broader social
systems in which they occur. Researchers not only frame their objects of
study as instances of general theoretical constructions but also as
phenomena embedded within specific social systems, where their specific
observations gain relevance as salient events characteristic of a
particular kind of social system (cf. Martin 2017).

Continuing with the earlier example, researchers might describe mothers'
decisions around childcare and work differently depending on the social
systems they examine, such as racialized systems (Dow 2016) or rural
settings (Sano et al. 2010). Furthermore, even within the same social
system, researchers can describe the same action differently depending
on the aspects they wish to highlight (cf. Lareau 2021). For instance,
Lisa's decision to quit her job while her husband did not could be
framed as a result of gender-role beliefs within the household or as a
rational response to financial and structural constraints. These
differing perspectives reflect not just different mechanisms but also
the perspectival nature of observations and descriptions (Massimi 2022),
which are shaped by the broader social systems and phenomena that
researchers aim to understand. Furthermore, it is by linking statistical
observations of individuals actions and characteristics (see for e.g.,
Berniell et al. 2021; Cukrowska-Torzewska and Matysiak 2020; Goldin et
al. 2024) to their relations with the labor-market and the family that
such statistical descriptions and inferences gain relevance. And the
same goes for qualitative observations as no detailed description makes
sense outside the collective arrangements and social space where it
takes place (Abbott 1997).

Recognizing the role of systems also helps clarify the relationship
between causal and constitutive arguments. While it is intuitive to
distinguish between what produces an event (causal arguments) and what
the event itself is (constitutive arguments), there are cases where
causal mechanisms are integral to the phenomena being studied. It is not
merely that causal elements relate to constitutive arguments, as
Pacewicz (2022) suggests, but that they can be constitutive of the
phenomena themselves. Failing to recognize this risks reinforcing the
traditional description/explanation divide, which qualitative research
has sought to transcend (Lichterman and Reed 2015; Reed 2011).

To bridge this divide, we must recognize, as Glennan (2017) does,
instances of \emph{constitutive production}, where a single event causes
changes in its constituent entities. Glennan's example of searing a
steak illustrates this point, as the changes induced by the heat (and
the pan) directly alter the steak's fundamental components. As he
describes:

In searing (in a pan) the heat is transferred from the heated pan to the
meat by conduction. This heat transfer initiates a variety of different
chemical processes in the various parts of the meat. It melts fats; it
denatures proteins, etc. The particular chemical properties that are
characteristic of the activity of searing are those that cause meat to
brown (p. 181).

In the scenario presented by Haslanger (2016), the production of
disadvantages for women in the workplace and childrearing is a
fundamental aspect of the system itself. This systematic reproduction of
such disadvantages underscores why the system is structurally unjust.
Consequently, the mechanization of labor-market and household
activities, which perpetuate these disadvantages---resulting in lower
earnings for women and, in some cases, their resignation from the
workforce---becomes a constitutive element of the socio-economic system.

This represents a case of constitutive production, wherein the
mechanization of action in the labor market, such as the imposition of
inflexible working hours (among other structural features), creates a
tendency for mothers like Lisa to leave their jobs. This outcome
constitutes a change in the status of one or more constitutive actors
within the system. Moreover, in this case, constitutive descriptions and
causal mechanisms intersect, as the mechanisms not only produce changes
in the roles of constitutive actors but are also integral to the very
structure of the system in its inherent injustice.

Hence, while it is conceptually valuable to distinguish between
constitutive and causal arguments, these categories are not merely
interconnected; they often overlap.

Moreover, by examining how the microelements of social life (mechanisms
and constitutive features) operate and integrate within broader social
systems, we gain insight into their relationships and roles in
sociological explanations. Ultimately, both mechanistic and constitutive
arguments underscore that explanations inherently require a substantial
description of the phenomena under study, elucidating how and why they
occur within larger systems. Hence, while differentiating between
explaining why an event occurs and describing the event itself may be
possible, description and explanation inevitably bleed into each other
in the pursuit of non-causal explanations.

~

\subsection*{Systems and
generalizations}\label{systems-and-generalizations}

There are at least two key distinctions that need to be addressed when
discussing generalizations in sociology: (1) the distinction between
empirical and theoretical generalizations, and (2) the varying notions
of context-independence found in the literature on social mechanisms.
The first distinction, common in qualitative sociology, contrasts the
ability to generalize from sampled observations to a broader,
non-observed population with the capacity to generalize to abstract
concepts applicable across multiple cases (see for e.g., Collins et al.
2024; Hedström and Ylikoski 2010; Lichterman and Reed 2015; Mahoney and
Goertz 2006; Ragin and Becker 1992; Small 2009). Table 3 below
illustrates how this broad approach to generalization aligns with
specific understandings of mechanisms.

\textbf{*** Please insert Table 3 around here ***}

As Table 3 shows, population-based context dependence and its
application in quantitative sociology through intervening variables most
closely align with the concept of empirical generalizations. By
contrast, theory-oriented context dependence aligns well with
theoretical generalizations. This distinction suggests that empirical
generalizations are typically associated with quantitative sociologists
who construct representative samples, while theoretical generalizations
are particularly relevant for qualitative researchers that seek to
demonstrate the broader relevance of their findings beyond their
observed population. However, case-oriented context dependence occupies
an uneasy position. It reframes the question of generalizability as an
empirical issue---namely, the re-identification of similar mechanisms in
previously unobserved cases. This approach differs from theoretical
generalizations, which abstract concepts to explain multiple cases, by
focusing on the empirical identification of recurring mechanisms.

To achieve case-oriented generalizations, portable theories, be
necessary. However, if we define portable theories as models capable of
explaining both observed and unobserved cases after proper empirical
identification, it becomes unclear how this differs from empirical
generalizations, except for the quantitative emphasis on representative
sampling.

Pacewicz (2022) challenges the distinction between theoretical and
empirical generalizations, arguing it is both logically and practically
flawed. First, it implies that theoretically oriented qualitative
researchers should refrain from making claims about empirical conditions
in unobserved cases, yet they often do so and with justification through
constitutive arguments. Second, the distinction sets an unattainably
high standard for social science, as no method can provide deterministic
insights into unobserved cases. As Pacewicz (2022) insightfully notes,
representative samples allow probabilistic statements about unobserved
cases but do not provide empirical certainty. Third, if external
validity refers to a logical basis for confidence in probabilistic
claims, qualitative sociologists can and do achieve this through
alternative methods.

In practice, both quantitative and qualitative sociologists rely on
theories to interpret empirical regularities. As Pacewicz (2022:943)
states, ``survey methodologists explain regularities by treating cases
as members of a population in the statistical sense, an abstraction that
cannot be empirically observed. Theoretically inclined ethnographers
explain regularities via recourse to constitutive properties and
mechanisms, which can similarly defy empirical observation and are
sometimes only inferable from empirical patterns.'' This observation
collapses the distinction between theoretical and empirical
generalizations, suggesting a focus instead on the design choices and
argumentative strategies sociologists use to justify their generalizable
claims.

Then, we can interpret Pacewicz (2022) argument as implying that both
mechanistic (quantitative or qualitative) and constitutive arguments
depend on case-oriented context independence. In both instances, whether
something recurs in similar ways across unobserved cases is an empirical
question, even though the methods used to address it may differ.
Regardless of method, good theories are essential for establishing
generalizability.

This perspective represents a meaningful step forward in understanding
the general principles underlying generalizations in sociology. However,
Pacewicz's (2022) argument has two distinct components: (1)
demonstrating the relevance of constitutive arguments alongside causal
mechanisms, and (2) showing that qualitative researchers can and do
justify the generalizability of constitutive arguments. While he
successfully achieves both aims, his argument for the external validity
of constitutive elements relies on an intuitive understanding of how
specific kinds of social systems function.

Desmond's (2012) example, which Pacewicz (2022) discusses extensively,
illustrates this point. Desmond's constitutive argument about the
survival strategies of the urban poor can be reconstructed as follows:
(1) in the absence of kin support, the evicted turn to disposable ties;
(2) these ties are characterized by accelerated and simulated intimacy
with new acquaintances; (3) the evicted form, utilize, and then burn
through these ties; and (4) this sequence constitutes their survival
strategy. Pacewicz (2022) argues that such findings should be considered
provisionally externally valid, as Desmond's model is able to explain
prior research demonstrating how the urban poor survive without kin
support and resolve theoretical problems in such literature. By
identifying disposable ties as a building block of social reality,
Desmond establishes their relevance in explaining survival strategies
more generally. As Pacewicz observes, while it is possible that
disposable ties might not exist outside Milwaukee, this limitation
applies equally to claims based on representative samples (Harris et al.
2010).

Implicit in this argument is the expectation that disposable ties are
constitutive elements of broader social realities, particularly in
social systems that replicate similar problems. Desmond (2012)
identifies several obstacles faced by evicted individuals seeking kin
support: (1) absence of kin; (2) resource-deprived or troubled kin; (3)
legal constraints, such as home inspections for family members on
parole; and (4) psychological costs, including feelings of shame or
humiliation when approaching better-off relatives. In social systems
that reproduce these constraints, it is reasonable to expect similar
survival strategies, such as disposable ties.

Thus, the question of how to produce logically warranted generalizations
revolves around two key considerations: (1) what specifically is being
generalized---such as an event, a set of actions that constitute an
aspect of social reality, or a mechanism; and (2) what features of
systems indicate that the problems eliciting such events or actions are
likely to recur in other observed cases. While much of the literature
emphasizes the first question---debating how mechanisms, descriptions,
or theoretical claims are generalized---it is by thinking through
system's characteristics that we can logically ground our
generalizations, regardless of methodological approach. Although it must
be recognized that quantitative approaches, with their statistical tools
and procedures, often excel in identifying and characterizing broad
patterns and recurring features within systems.

Finally, while the definitions of causal mechanisms proposed in this
article (see Table 2) suggest that recurrence and generalizability are
not necessary criteria for mechanisms or mechanistic
explanations---since mechanisms can explain highly localized or one-off
phenomena---it remains true that some forms of mechanized action tend to
recur across cases. Which seems to imply that, in social systems, humans
often encounter similar problems due to shared structural features,
making the question of generalizability fundamentally empirical and
methodological rather than a one-fit-for all theory.

\par\null

\section*{Conclusion}\label{conclusion}

Over the last two decades, the emphasis on causal mechanisms has
significantly advanced sociological explanations by sharpening our focus
on the microelements of social life and their role in producing social
phenomena. However, this focus has also exposed the limitations of
mechanistic explanations in bridging the interpretative and causal
divides within the social sciences, highlighting inconsistencies across
current approaches. Specifically, I identify five key points of
discussion in the literature: (1) the definitions of social mechanisms
and systems, (2) their modularity, (3) the heterogeneous epistemic
standards for mechanistic explanations, (4) the relationship between
causal and constitutive explanations, and (5) their context-dependence.
These unresolved issues have fragmented sociological arguments and
hindered the integration of explanatory and descriptive elements into a
cohesive framework.

To address this fragmentation, this article advocated for a shift from
focusing on microelements of social life to the larger the social
systems in which they operate. While scholars have recognized the
importance of situating mechanisms within broader contexts (Gross 2018;
Knight and Reed 2019), we still lack a well-developed conceptualization
of such systems. To bridge this gap, I proposed both a general systems
approach and a sociologically tailored framework (see Table 2).
Specifically, I advanced a perspective that defines systems not through
differentiation theories but as \emph{material systems} (Haslanger 2016,
2018)---networks of humans, material, and cultural elements bound by
causal and constitutive relations that in virtue of its actors'
activities do something, and perdure due to the \emph{mechanization} of
human action (see Reed 2020).

Building on Reed's (2020:69) question, ``When, where, and how does human
life become mechanistic?'' I argued that social mechanisms operate
through \emph{processes of delegation}, wherein humans and materials are
enlisted to act as if they were \emph{machines} to achieve specific
projects. This reconceptualization broadens the definition of social
mechanisms beyond previous approaches rooted in pragmatism, critical
realism, or analytical sociology. It also challenges the assumption that
\emph{modularity}---where an intervention in one part of a system does
not affect other parts---is a defining characteristic of mechanisms
(Hedström and Ylikoski 2010). Instead, the extent to which a chain of
action has been mechanized to isolate its elements is an \emph{empirical
question} (see also Glennan 2017).

Treating modularity as an empirical issue also led us to reconcile the
differing epistemic standards for mechanistic explanations. By
formulating both a minimal approach and its sociological specificities,
we uncover a unified epistemic foundation underlying mechanistic
explanations. This perspective demonstrated that while pragmatists
emphasize the meaningful and creative dimensions of human action and
analytical sociologists focus on individual properties driving emergent
collective phenomena, both ultimately anchor their models in real
processes of mechanization within social systems.

I argued that focusing on social systems provides a framework for
understanding the relationship between bare causal relationships, the
mechanistic processes underlying them, and their connection to
non-causal forms of explanation (see Glennan 2017). Without paying
attention to systems, we risk neglecting non-causal explanations, which
address \emph{why} questions by demonstrating how social spaces and
available resources shape actors' decisions and actions. Similarly,
situating actors within broader relationships and systems allows us to
trace the multiple causal chains that produce outcomes of interest
(Gross 2018) and to identify which systemic features make causal
relationships recurring patterns in social life. Moreover, this allows
us to see cases where mechanisms can actively reshape the constitutive
elements of a system, thereby becoming integral to the system itself.
For example, mechanisms that perpetuate structural injustices---such as
gendered labor-market inequalities (Goldin 2014; Goldin et al. 2024;
Haslanger 2016)---become defining features of these systems by
continuously reproducing their effects. Which means that we have events
of \emph{constitutive production} where causal and constitutive
arguments bleed into each other.

Additionally, social systems are crucial in making sociological
descriptions and explanations analytically relevant. They provide a
reference point that enables scholars to highlight key aspects of a
phenomenon and connect these observations to broader theoretical
debates. Rather than solely \emph{casing} (Collins et al. 2024;
Lichterman and Reed 2015; Ragin and Becker 1992) objects of study as
instances of general theoretical constructs, we also embed them within
social systems. This embedding gives specific observations their
significance as salient events characteristic of particular social
systems, since social facts cannot be understood in isolation from the
social spaces where they occur (Abbott 1997).

Finally, drawing on Pacewicz's (2022) observation that the conventional
distinction between empirical and theoretical generalizations is both
practically and logically unsound (Pacewicz 2020), I suggested reframing
generalization to focus on how social systems shape the recurrence of
mechanisms and constitutive elements across contexts. Social systems
generate recurring constraints and opportunities, leading to similar
problems and behaviors across different settings. For example, the
creation and burning of disposable ties (Desmond 2012) emerges in
systems marked by resource scarcity, limited kin support, and structural
obstacles. In such contexts, it is reasonable to expect that the urban
poor will mechanize their relationships through disposable ties as a
survival strategy. Thus, generalizability depends on identifying the
systemic features that create conditions for certain problems and
solutions to recur across diverse populations.

This general reorientation provides an updated understanding of social
systems, yet it ultimately reflects a novel re-rendering of Mill's
(2000) classical sociological insight: strong sociological arguments
link individual experiences with the structural features of society.
While we have gone small---dissecting social life into mechanisms and
constitutive elements---it is through their integration within social
systems that we can move beyond a fragmented understanding of
sociological arguments. This approach allows us to address key debates
on description, causal and non-causal explanation, generalization, and
their interconnections.

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~

~

\section*{Tables and Figures}\label{tables-and-figures}

Table 1: Approaches to social mechanisms by sociological underpinning
and ontological/epistemological aspects\selectlanguage{english}
\begin{table*}[H]
\centering
\normalsize\begin{tabulary}{1.0\textwidth}{CCCCCCCCCC}
T &  &  &  &  &  &  &  &  &  \\
 &  &  &  &  &  &  &  &  &  \\
 &  &  &  &  &  &  & Sociological underpinning &  &  \\
 &  &  &  &  &  &  & Pragmatism & Analytical sociology  & Critical realism \\
 &  &  &  &  & Ontological and epistemological aspects & Entities and activities of mechanisms & Mechanisms represent the actual chains of meaning and action leading to a phenomenon & Mechanisms represent the actors' desires beliefs and opportunities that, in tandem, produce phenomena & Mechanisms are part of the world's causal structure and can be grouped within social structures, agency, and culture \\
 &  &  &  &  &  & Standards for mechanistic explanation & Metaphoric & Formal & Substantive \\
 &  &  &  &  &  & Modularity  & Meaningful & Modular & Meaningful \\
 &  &  &  &  &  & Context-dependence & Case oriented & Theory oriented & Case oriented \\
\end{tabulary}
\end{table*}~Table 2: Key concepts definition's\selectlanguage{english}
\begin{longtable}[]{@{}lll@{}}
\toprule
~ & General & Social\tabularnewline
System & A whole or set of entities bounded by causal, constitutive or
structural relations that in virtue of its parts or entities' activities
do something and perdures in time & A network of humans, material and
cultural elements bounded by causal and constitutive relations that in
virtue of its actors' activities do something and perdure due to the
mechanization of human action ~\tabularnewline
Structure & A set of relations that make up a system (see Haslanger
2018) & The set of relations between humans, material and cultural
elements that make up a social system\tabularnewline
Mechanism & ``Entities (or parts) whose activities and interactions are
organized as to be responsible for a phenomenon'' (Glennan 2017:17) & A
chain of power relations and practices that through the delegation of
projects to both humans and technology make social relations run as if
they were a machine (Reed 2020) to accomplish a project of
interest\tabularnewline
Practice & NA & Patterns of learned behavior that enable humans to
coordinate as members of a group in creating, distributing, managing,
maintaining, eliminating a valued resource due to mutual responsiveness
to each other's actions and resources (Haslanger 2018)\tabularnewline
\bottomrule
\end{longtable}

Table 3:~ Types of generalizability by mechanistic notions of
context-independence

\par\null\selectlanguage{english}
\begin{table*}[H]
\centering
\normalsize\begin{tabulary}{1.0\textwidth}{CCCCCCCCC}
Tab &  &  &  &  &  &  &  &  \\
 &  &  &  &  &  &  &  &  \\
 &  &  &  &  &  &  &  &  \\
 &  &  &  &  &  &  &  &  \\
 &  &  &  &  &  &  &  &  \\
 &  &  &  &  &  & Theory oriented  & Population based & Case oriented  \\
 &  &  &  &  & Theoretical & x &  &  \\
 &  &  &  &  & Empirical &  & x & ? \\
\end{tabulary}
\end{table*}Figure 1: Simplified diagram of a social system (slightly altered from
Glennan 2017)

~\selectlanguage{english}
\begin{figure}[H]
\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.70\columnwidth]{figures/Fig-1--Gender-social-syst/Fig-1--Gender-social-syst}

\end{center}
\end{figure}

\section*{Notes~}

{\label{469856}}

\protect\hyperlink{_ednref1}{{[}i{]}} Whether this statistical
relationship is causal, or the result of an exogenous boost remains a
contested issue. However, the example serves the purposes of this
article effectively. For a more detailed discussion of this topic, see
Goldin et al. (2024) and Killewald and Lundberg (2017).

\par\null

\par\null







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