Bargaining game based on psychology cost of electric vehicles and risk
assessment of aggregator
Abstract
As electric vehicles(EVs) begin to participate in the peak regulating
auxiliary service market, it has become a major problem that how can
price aggregators maximize the peak shaving capacity provided by EVs and
maximize their own interests. This paper proposes a bargaining game
pricing method based on the psychology cost of EVs and the risk
assessment of aggregators. First of all, according to the impact of
users’ participation in peak shaving on the battery life of EVs, the
impact of participation in peak shaving on users’ original travel plans
and time, and the impact of aggregator pricing on users’ psychology, the
comprehensive psychology cost of EV users is obtained. Then, based on
the user’s psychology cost and the law of gravitation, the evaluation
scheme for the peak shaving capacity of EVs is obtained. On the basis of
conditional value at risk(CVaR), the mixed CVaR is obtained by
considering the behavior of users who may chase risks. Based on the
mixed CVaR, the risk assessment of aggregators’ participation in the
peak regulating auxiliary service market is carried out. According to
the above information, the aggregators and the EV teams are engaged in a
bargaining game based on the peak shaving pricing problem, which is
divided into complete information game and incomplete information game.
Finally, the feasibility of the proposed method is verified by an
example analysis.