How precision medicine changes medical epistemology: A formative case
from Norway
Abstract
Rationale and aims: Precision medicine (PM) raises a key question: How
can we know what works when the number of people with a health problem
becomes small or one (n=1)? We here present a formative case from
Norway. The Norwegian Board of Health Supervision was faced with a
cancer patient, who had improved after treatment with a drug in the
private health sector but was refused continued treatment in the public
health service due to lack of clinical trial evidence. The Board
overturned this decision, arguing that the drug had been unambiguously
documented to work in the individual case. We aim to provide an in-depth
analysis of this case and The Board´s decision and thereby to illustrate
and elucidate key epistemological and ethical issues and developments in
PM. Method: We provide our analysis and discussion using tools of
critical thinking and concepts from philosophy of science and medicine
such as uncertainty, evidence, forms of inference and causation. We also
examine the case in the light of the history of evidence-based medicine
(EBM). Results and discussion: The case reflects an epistemological
shift in medicine where PM puts greater emphasis on evidence that arises
in individual patients after the treatment is provided over preexisting
population-based evidence. PM may rely more heavily on abduction to
decide what works and qualitative, rather than quantitative judgments.
The case also illustrates a possible shift in the concept of causation
from regularity accounts to mechanistic and process accounts. We discuss
ethical implications of a shift from more “traditional” to
“personalized EBM”. Conclusion: A framework that is more based on
abductions and evidence arising in the individual case has problems in
creating quantifiable, reliable, and generalizable evidence, and in
promoting transparency and accountability. PM currently lacks clear
criteria for deciding what works in an individual, posing ethical
challenges.